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Abstract 
The current post-crisis era in most world countries motivates business entities to focus on improving of risk 
governance functions. It is mostly concerned to banks because of risky nature of their business. Before global 
financial crisis the executive compensation in most banks was excessive, that, in turn, led to systemic risk 
growth. According to transaction cost theory corporate governance is focused at effective performance of 
banking transactions. In connection with the above-stated thesis the important task at the time is improving 
the system of executive remuneration in order to ensure the moderate bank risk level. With this aim in 2008 
Swiss bank UBS has implemented new compensation system that assumes the clawback provision. This clause 
concerning the deferred awards of senior managers’ remuneration was included to increase their accountabil-
ity for loss-creating or fraud behavior. The paper investigates the aftermath of clawback of executive com-
pensation implementation in the biggest European banks and discusses the specific features of the reformed 
remuneration system amongst financial institutions. Furthermore, after implementation of the clawback pro-
vision in leading banks of Europe similar practice has been started in financial institutions of USA, features 
of which is researched in the paper. 
Keywords: risk-adjusted executive compensation, clawback, risk governance, CEO 
JEL Classification: J30, J33, M12, M52, G21, G30, G32. 
Introduction 
One of the key evidences of the global financial crisis is that compensation systems of senior executives must 
be designed in order to control and mitigate excessive risk-taking. In recent times the necessity of interde-
pendence of executives’ remuneration with the results of bank performance is underlined in a range of rec-
ommendations developed by European banking associations. Much attention is paid to strengthening the link 
between compensation and risk governance: banks implement diversified ex-ante and ex-post risk adjustment 
measures (Afanasieva, 2011). In this aspect one must specify Basel Committee on Banking Supervision rec-
ommendations and EBA Guidelines on Internal Governance (GL 44). The range of reforms in banks’ remu-
neration policies has been made to adjust executive compensation to riskiness. One of the implemented 
measures was the increase of deferred part of executive payments in equity. The recent trend of ex-post risk 
adjustment assumes providing of correlation between prospective bank performance and amount of executive 
payoffs. As a result of mentioned trends and widescale frauds in financial sector, individual global systemi-
cally important banks have slightly reformed their compensation schemes for senior executives. The change-
able model of remuneration is directed towards promoting long-term incentives for CEO and Board members, 
as far as shareholders are not aimed to pay for executives’ flaws. The topic is of current interest: thus, accord-
ing to statistical data 84% of the Fortune 100 companies publicly disclosed introduction of clawback provi-
sions in 2011, in contrast to less than 18% in 20061.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1 illustrates the conditions that have caused the 
changes in banks’ remuneration policies. Section 2 analyzes the essence of executive bonuses’ clawback pro-
visions in financial institutions. The practical experience of their implementation in individual European banks 
is specified in section 3, following by section 4 that reviews state regulation of clawback provisions in US 
banks. section 5 concludes.  
 
 
 
                                                     
1 According to provider of executive compensation data Equilar. 
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1. Changes in bank financial performance and executive compensation 
Among the recommendations worked out for world and European banks, special attention is paid to the es-
tablishment of flexible component of senior executives’ compensation. According to Guidelines on remuner-
ation policies and practices introduced by Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) in 2010 the 
variable to fixed compensation ratio has to be appropriately balanced. 
Table 1 observes ratios of variable-to-fixed remuneration of CEOs in 2006-2011. The represented banks have 
been selected among largest European banks as ones that have implemented the clawback provisions for ex-
ecutive remuneration during recent years.  
Table 1. Ratio of variable-to-fixed remuneration for selected EU banks’ CEOs in 2006-2011 
Bank 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Barclays 2.6 3.3 0.0 0.0 2.5 3.7 
Credit Suisse  n/a n/a 0.0 0.0 4.1 1.33 
Deutsche Bank 10.4 11.0 0.0 7.2 2.8 2.8 
HSBC 1.6 0.9 0.0 3.7 2.4 3.6 
ING Bank 3.1 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 
Royal Bank of Scotland 6.3 6.7 5.2 4.4 5.1 5.4 
Standard Chartered 1.9 3.6 2.9 3.7 4.0 3.7 
UniCredit* n/a n/a n/a 0.2 0.5 0.0 
Notes: * no data available before 2009. 
Source: bank annual reports, Murphy (2013). 
In most banks the median ratio “variable-to-fixed” compensation for CEO in European banks fell during the 
crisis period (2008-2009). In Deutsche Bank, ING Bank, Royal Bank of Scotland the ratio currently did not 
reach its pre-crisis level. Smaller reduction occurred to Standard Chartered, while for CEOs of UniCredit and 
ING fixed remuneration equals 100%. 
During recent years the reforms in compensation policies in banking institutions are motivated by financial 
difficulties arisen by global crisis. The other reason that has made a significant impact on the activity of 
observed banks is fraud activity of senior executives. As a result of LIBOR scandal1 and mis-selling of pay-
ment protection insurance2 to consumers banks were fined by European regulators. In Table 2 we compiled 
data on the dynamics of total income of individual banks and losses caused by penalties. 
Table 2. Total income and regulatory fines (due to LIBOR scandal) of selected systemically important 
European banks in 2010-2012 
Bank 
Total income, mln. Amount of fines, 
mln. Euro Currency 2010 2011 2012 
Barclays GBP 31.440 32.292 24.691 32 
UBS CHF 31.994 27.788 25.443 10 
Credit Suisse CHF 5.098 1.953 1.349 n/a 
HSBC USD 80.014 83.461 82.545 n/a 
Lloyds GBP 24.868 20.802 20.510 n/a 
The Royal Bank of Scotland GBP 146.072 281.348 224.268 391.1 
Source: European Commission, annual reports  
The largest reduction has taken place in Barclays bank – the total income decreased for 24%. It is worth to 
mention that in geographical scale the largest income reduction is observed in United Kingdom – from 49% 
                                                     
1 LIBOR scandal was a reaction on investigation of fraud activities associated with London Interbank Offered Rate started in 2008. 
The investigation has been started in 2011 by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and Justice Department, followed by the 
governments of the United Kingdom, Japan, the European Union and Switzerland. As a result number of senior executives of leading 
banks has been resigned; banks were fined by regulatory bodies. 
2 More than £10bn now has been returned to payment protection insurance (PPI) policy holders by the banks that have been mis-sold. 
The total amount that has been compensated by banks is £14bn. 
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in 2011 to 31% in 2012. It is associated with LIBOR fraud activities of bank’s senior executives and mis-
selling of Payment Protection Insurance to consumers. The largest amounts of fines had been recorded on 
Deutsche Bank and Société Générale: 725.4 and 445.9 respectively. In certain cases among observed EU fines 
can reach up to 10% of bank’s global turnover. All these cases refer to managerial misconduct and frauds, 
which leads to additional costs for banks’ shareholders.  
Moreover the fraudulent cases obviously made a significant negative impact on banks’ reputation. That is especially 
crucial in case of global systemically important banks, which has been mostly involved in scandals.  
Due to this, the need of compensation policy transformation seems to be logical and fair. 
In what follows, we research the specific features and the mechanism of new remuneration systems imple-
mented by leading European banks, compensation clawback provisions in particular and their effect. The 
necessity of the research is explained by the need to define the trends in banks’ executive remuneration 
schemes implementation and the reasons of their motivation. 
2. Clawback provisions: theoretical and legislative framework  
According to Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices published in December 2010, by Committee 
of European Banking Supervisors clawback is defined as “contractual agreement in which the staff member 
agrees to return ownership of an amount of remuneration to the institution under certain circumstances”. In 
scientific researches and bank reports the following terms can be used to determine clawbacks: “claw”, “for-
feit”, “recapture”, “recover”, “recoup”, and “reimburse” (Chen, Greene and Owers, 2013). 
At the time of the research, there are no many scientific researches on clawing back excessive pay-offs namely 
in banks, although financial institutions have its specifics among other firms. The other investigations did not 
evidence practical application of clawbacks after their implementation. The reasons of that is rather new con-
cept of executive compensation forfeiture practice that has been introduced in recent years. 
The positive effect of clawback provisions is underlined in researches of Brian, Van Reenen (2010), Chan, 
Chen, Chen (2013). In the latter paper authors prove that financial institutions introducing bonuses forfeiture 
for executives demonstrating financial reporting integrity. The clawbacks can be the incentive for executives 
to pay more attention to long-term risks, as well as short-term (Miller, 2012). 
The cons against the clawback clause in bank remuneration codes also exist. Thus, during severe situation in 
economy and financial market in particular senior executives can be motivated more by short-term compen-
sation, but not long-term. Introduction of bonuses clawback in financial institution can be dejecting for exec-
utive employees in such conditions and may force to quite (Randall, Allen, 2009).  
The incentives to introduce clawback provision policy in companies can vary. Chen, Greene and Owers (2013) 
prove that firms are more inclined to voluntary implementation of clawback policy when chief executives face 
less uncertainty about earnings and compensation. Thus, banking is more risky as a matter of its nature.  
Babenko, Bennett et al. (2012) state that the incentives for a company to implement clawback provisions 
among others are the prior malufeasance of executives; complexity in its detection or there is more scope for 
malfeasance. Fried and Shilon (2011) determined that very few among S&P 500 firms have voluntarily 
adopted clawback policy. 
At the time there is a lack of publications investigating the specifics of bonuses forfeiture in financial institu-
tions that creates a significant gap in executive remuneration theoretical research. 
During recent years in EU countries much attention has been paid to strengthening the efficiency of remuner-
ation systems at financial institutions. The national financial regulatory bodies implemented codes that defined 
the necessity of deferred pay-offs and bonus clawback provisions. In other member-states executive compen-
sation policy complied with EU guidelines and recommendations. Among legislative regulation of bonus 
clawbacks there are the following:  
1. Guidelines on Remuneration Policies and Practices (Committee of European Banking Supervisors, 2010) 
directed to national regulators of EU countries. 
2. FSF Principles for Sound Compensation Practices (the Group of Twenty, 2009).  
Business Ethics and Leadership, Volume 1, Issue 1, 2017   
 30 
3. Financial Services Authority (FSA) Remuneration Code of UK was approved in 2010 after CEBS Guide-
lines, reflecting its main provisions. 
4. FINMA (Switzerland) – in 2009 the remuneration schemes for Swiss banks has been modified by issuing 
the FINMA Circular. The document welcomes clawback provisions for directors’ compensation in banks. 
Therefore, the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority did not define the clear criteria for subjects 
and occasions when they are implemented1.  
5. Germany’s regulator of financial institutions Bafin in Germany (2009). 
The guidelines issued by European regulators, e.g. CEBS and FSF do not have a prescriptive character, but 
mostly the recommendation is as “one size fits all”. But certain national regulators, especially in UK, have 
followed the new reforms in compensation policy. The rapidity of FSA’s response is connected probably with 
the range of executives’ misconduct in financial institutions taken place in UK during last years. They have 
involved Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds Banking Group. 
In particular, FSA Remuneration Code states the necessity of subjecting executive bonuses to potential claw-
back arrangements in the following incidents: “there is a reasonable evidence of employee misbehavior or ma-
terial error, or the firm or the relevant business unit suffers a material downturn in its financial performance, or 
the firm or the relevant business unit suffers a material failure of risk management”. 
3. The mechanism of executives’ bonus clawback implementation in European banks 
The new remuneration system of executive directors has been introduced at first by the bank UBS. After 
events of global financial crisis and in light of Basel III implementation in leading countries it has been an 
important task to enhance a corporate governance and risk function in financial institutions (Afanasieva, 
Scherbina, 2013). Previous systems based on correlation of directors’ compensation with bank financial per-
formance became questionable. So the Swiss bank became the first to introduce compensation system aimed 
to incentivized top executives.  
Thus in 2012 there had been some changes implemented in the compensation system. The deferral period was 
prolonged from 3 to 5 years. Moreover, the amount of award that could be clawbacked in case of not achieving 
the average adjusted pre-tax profit during the period by the bank is equal to 100%. The financial condition is 
defined by measuring the bankʼs RoTE (return on tangible equity): if the indicator’s level is less than 6%, the 
bonus can be forfeiture partially or to full extent.  
In practice by the end of 2012 UBS demonstrated financial losses. Due to these results executive directors did 
not receive in cash any part of performance bonus. This entire amount has been deferred with the possibility 
to forfeiture it in case the performance won’t achieve the planned level.  
Comparing to Swiss bank, UK’s bank Barclays has set different criteria to make a decision concerning com-
pensation clawback. Among the events that can lead to award forfeiture are the following: 
1. employeeʼs misconduct that can make significant influence on bank’s reputation; 
2. frauds (material restatement of bank’s financial statements); 
3. material failure of risk governance; 
4. significant deterioration of financial performance of the bank. 
Figure 1 demonstrates the executive compensation mechanism (including CEO) in UBS bank. 
                                                     
1Bichsel, A. (2009) FINMA publishes Circular on remuneration schemes. Available at: http://www.finma.ch/e/ aktuell/Pages/mm-rs-
verguetungssysteme-20091111.aspx. 
Cooper, D. (2009). Swiss regulators impose new remuneration schemes for financial institutions, Lexology – Association of Corporate 
Counsel. Available at: http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8fbd0f6a-ff77-49b6-b789-6182f25cad5a 
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Figure 1. Executive directors’ compensation mechanism (including CEO) in UBS1 
In comparison with UBS, Credit Suisse bank pays to executive directors about 40% of deferred award in 3 
years and this amount is subject to clawback. The other deferred part (long-term award) vests for 5-year period 
and payoffs starts from the 3-d year. This amount of shares is not subject to forfeiture, as well as 10% of cash 
paid after reporting period.  
In UBS the deferred awards of executives are formed totally by shares. In comparison, in Barclays, Credit 
Suisse and Deutsche Bank the deferred bonuses are consist of both – cash and equity (see Table 3). 
Table 3. Structure of executives’ bonuses subjected to clawing back in individual banks 
Criterion UBS Barclays Credit Suisse Deutsche Bank HSBC 
Structure of award’s 
deferred part 
Cash - + + + - 
Shares + + + + + 
Subjected to clawback 
About 80% of 
deferred bonuses 
All deferred 
bonuses 
Short-term part of 
deferred bonuses 
All deferred bonuses 
All or 
part of 
award 
Source: Compensation Reports of UBS, Barclays, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, HSBC (2013) 
Let’s analyze the peculiarities of compensation clawing back executive bonuses (Table 4). The attention must 
be paid to the following aspects: 
➢ covered employees (CEO, CFO, all executive officers); 
➢ covered compensation (cash, equity, all); 
➢ triggering events. 
The events that can lead to claw back of compensation can be measured in different ways. Thus, Schneider 
(2009) distinguishes three categories of triggering events: 
                                                     
1Based on UBS Compensation Report (2013). Available at: http://www.static-ubs.com/global/en/about_ubs/investor_relations/annu-
alreporting/2013/_jcr_content/par/teaserbox_6c86/teaser_1/linklist/link.1486749471.file/bGluay9wYXRoPS9jb250ZW50L2Rhb 
S9zdGF0aWMvZ2xvYmFsL2ludmVzdG9yX3JlbGF0aW9ucy9hbm51YWwyMDEzL0NSMjAxMy1lbi5wZGY=/CR2013-en.pdf 
 
Deferred Contingent Capital 
Plan (DCCP) 
40% 
Cash 
20% 
Base salary 
Current  
year 
1st 
year 
2nd 
year  
3d 
year 
4th 
year 
5th 
year 
Equity ownership plan 
(EOP) 
40% 
14% 
 
13% 
13% 
Shares 
awarded.  
 
Up to 100% 
can be for-
feited 
 
40% 
 
Awards in 
the form of  
 notional 
bonds.  
Awards are 
subject to 
20%  
forfeiture 
20% 
 
Business Ethics and Leadership, Volume 1, Issue 1, 2017   
 32 
1. Performance-based when bonuses are clawed back in case of financial misstatements caused by actions 
of an executive. 
2. Fraud-based when bonuses are clawed back in case of executive’s fraud activity or misconduct that has 
negative impact on bank reputation. 
3. Other. 
Table 4. Specific features of clawback provision in large European banks* 
Bank Country Covered employees 
Covered 
compensation 
Triggering event for clawback 
Barclays** UK Executive directors 
Cash bonuses, 
share bonuses 
Financial and non-financial indicators: em-
ployee misconduct, harm to bank’s reputa-
tion, financial misstatement, material failure 
of risk management, significant deterioration 
in the financial health of bank. 
Credit Suisse Switzerland 
Members of Execu-
tive Board, 
CEO 
Shares 
➢ negative bank financial performance 
➢ actions that lead or can lead to reputa-
tional risk 
Deutsche Bank Germany 
Management Board, 
CEO Equity 
➢ negative net income before taxes for any 
year during vesting term, 20 % of the 
award are forfeited  
➢ misconduct, including dishonesty, fraud, 
misrepresentation or breach of trust 
HSBC** UK 
Senior executives 
and risk-takers 
Shares 
Financial and nonfinancial performance 
measures. 
Lloyds Banking 
Group** 
UK Executive directors Shares 
Economic profit, absolute total shareholder 
return, customer satisfaction, total costs, non-
core assets at the end of 2015, SME lending 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland** 
UK Executive directors Equity (shares) 
Performance measures and relative weight-
ings are: 
➢ bank profit;  
➢ total shareholder return relative to com-
parator group of international banks; 
➢ balance sheet and risk strategic score-
card;  
➢ financial and risk performance; 
➢ underpin. 
UBS Switzerland 
Members of Execu-
tive Board, 
CEO 
Equity (notional 
bonds) 
➢ bank does not achieve adjusted pre-tax 
profit; 
➢ Basel III CET1 ratio falls below 7%; 
➢ viability event occurs. 
Source: Remuneration Codes and Compensation reports of banks 
Notes: *The clawback provisions has also been introduced in Standard Chartered, Commerzbank, ING, Unicredit that are not covered in the 
table due to absence of practical implications of the new remuneration policy. ** In line with the FSAʼs Remuneration Code. 
According to data of Table 4 the most involved banks among the observed ones are originated in UK. 
The country’s financial regulatory body – FSA – was among the first that have introduced new demands 
in compensation policy, including provision of bonus clawing back. It explains the harmonization of 
executive remuneration rules of Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds Banking Group.  
By means of Table 4 we can conclude that the clawback clause is applied not only for CEO, but for all 
members of bank Board of Directors in most banks.  
The important task is to define what indicators are used to make a decision to clawback bonuses of exec-
utive directors. In Credit Swiss, for instance, aiming to define the clawback amount of short-term incen-
tive awards the negative financial performance of the bank is assessed by the following indicators:  
1. In case of negative ROE the award of CEO and Executive Board members heading a shared  
services function amount is reduced by the same percentage. 
2. The triggering event for clawing back bonuses can be variety of situations, e.g. adverse individual, 
divisional or firm-wide factors, such as any activity that is materially detrimental to the bank, which 
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causes or could cause reputational risk or a significant downturn in financial performance or capital 
base, or a significant failure of risk management1. 
HSBC takes into account both financial and non-financial measures to assess the performance of execu-
tives when Board compensation committee makes a decision concerning clawbacks. Among financial 
measures are the following:  
1. Capital strength on the base of Core Tier 1 capital ratio, return on equity, cost efficiency ratio . 
2. Dividend payout. 
Non-financial measures that are estimated with the aim to define the necessity of award clawback include 
successful execution of strategy and measures related to risk and compliance.  
With the aim to define the amount of long-term incentives in Royal Bank of Scotland the financial indi-
cators are measured over 3 financial years, afterwards the decision concerning the clawing bank is made.  
As it was mentioned earlier, bonus clawback clause was firstly introduced in Swiss bank UBS. In some 
years the observed bank have implemented similar risk-adjusted remuneration policy. During this period 
due to range of misconducts and fraudulent acts awards of CEOs and Board members in some banks have 
been clawed back. The cases have been mostly related to LIBOR scandal. Table 5 summarizes some of events. 
Table 5. Summary of executive bonuses’ clawing back in individual European banks in 2010-2012* 
Bank Year 
Executives subjected to 
clawback 
Clawback amount Triggering event 
Barclays 2012-2013 
15 current and former 
employees 
Clawing back £300 mln. of 
unvested deferred and long 
term incentive awards and 
risk adjustments of £860 mln. 
to bank’s 2012 incentives 
pool. 
LIBOR investigation and 
other risk issues in 2012 
HSBC 2012 
Former chief executive former -
head of the Mexican unit 
£2 mln. of unvested shares. 
Mis-selling of nearly  
£300 mln. of long-term care 
bonds to elderly customers. 
As a result the bank was 
fined by the US regulatory 
body; the executives’ bo-
nuses were clawed back 
Lloyds Banking 
Group 
2013 
Former chief executive and 12 
former directors 
➢ 80% of CEO deferred 
award (about £1.15 mln.) 
➢ 40% of director’s  
deferred award. 
Mis-selling of payment pro-
tection insurance in 2009 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
2012 Two executive directors £112 mln. Libor scandal 
UBS 2011-2012 
Investment bankers whose bo-
nuses exceeded $2 mln. 
50% of share-based bonuses 
awarded. 
Approximately CHF 60 mln. 
of unvested deferred perfor-
mance awards has been for-
feited. 
Libor scandal (according to 
regulatory demand to pay 
$1.5 bn. in fines). 
* Source: banks’ annual reports. 
For example, in Barclays due to the LIBOR Employee Investigation Review Committee has been orga-
nized in 2012 to define the scale of misconduct and the executives to blame. According to data of Table 
5 we may conclude that senior executives can be subjected to clawback despite of the fact they have 
already been resigned. 
 
                                                     
1Credit Swiss Annual Report (2012). Available at: https://www.credit-suisse.com/publications/annualreporting/ 
doc/2012/csg_ar12_com pensation_en.pdf 
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4. Clawback provisions: the case of American banks 
Looking back at the past we have to state that in 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) has been introduced 
which gave the right to Securities Exchange Commission to forfeiture the executive remuneration in case 
of misconduct. Both CEO and CFO in term not more than one year are subject to clawback provision 
according this document. 
As we see, in certain cases the implementation of clawback provision in US banks can be forced by the gov-
ernment. For instance, during the global financial crisis 2008-2009 financial institutions have got the financial 
assistance from the government of USA participating in TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program). Instead 
banks have to pay back obligations to the Treasury of USA. Until that time chief executives’ remuneration 
included clawback provisions.   
Recently in 2010 under the Dodd-Frank Act (the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act) the requirement to exchange-listed firms (including banks as well) has been included. According to its 
provisions in case of financial misstatement the compensation has to be forfeitured from the executives over 
three-year period before the date of misstatement accounting. 
In comparison with European experience of executives’ bonus clawback possibility the US approach is more 
likely to the UK’s one. But still there are some distinctions, as new requirements are broader and stricter for 
American banks and can be summed up as follows: 
1. Applies to all executive officers, but not only to CEO and CFO. 
2. The act of “misconduct” is not required. 
3. The term of incentive-based parts of compensation restricted to clawback is prolonged: from one-year to 
three-year period. But still it is less than five-year term of clawing back possibility according to FSA 
Remuneration Code. 
Thus, for example, at US financial institution Morgan Stanley forfeiture refers to the events of substantial loss 
while trading with excessive risk-taking. Another bank Goldman Sachs can claw back executive compensation 
in case of “financial restatement or other significant harm” to bank’s business or in the event of individual 
misconduct that worsens reputation or makes legal harm. 
Conclusions 
Still there is range of problems connected with clawback implementation. According to analysis of imple-
mentation experience of forfeiture provisions for executive remuneration they can be high-cost to introduce, 
e.g. costs to enforce may exceed perceived or actual benefit. It also refers to taxes: if executives have paid 
taxes on awards, the mechanism of their transfer remains a question. Another group of complications may be 
related to executive employees that have already left the company. In this cases two main questions arise: 1) 
how the legitimacy of the process should be provided; 2) how to arrange the awards’ clawing back act for 
resigned executives. In some countries state employment legislative acts may prohibit forfeiture of previously 
paid awards, so the implementation of mentioned compensation policy can be costly and complicated. So for 
banks these challenges still remain. 
Also issue concerning the effectiveness of clawback provision policy remains. Did forfeiture provisions be-
come incentives for CEOs and Board members? What is the probability to identify fraud or misconduct in 
bank, as well as its direct causers? This issue is especially important when the triggering event for awards 
clawback is related to deterioration of financial performance – usually it is complicated to define directly 
responsible executives, as various underlying circumstances can appear as well. One more question remain - 
isn’t the probability to fraud identification and executives’ punishment for that lower than the benefits senior 
executives obtain in case of misconduct? 
We do not conduct empirical researches, but observations of clawback provision implementation in compen-
sation practices of leading European banks. Such character of research is explained by insufficient effects of 
reformed remuneration schemes due to relatively recent implementation. Thus, some consistent patterns can 
be defined analyzing the interdependence between the character of compensation policy on one side and 
shareholders’ structure on the other. Thus, the research shows that in individual banks executive bonuses 
forfeiture clauses are stricter (Lloyds Banking Group, Royal Bank of Scotland), while in others – moderate 
(Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Credit Swiss).  
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Firstly, conducted analyses of banks’ ownership structure and concentration, the following correlation can be 
stated. The banks with more concentrated ownership structure and financial institutions with prevailing state own-
ership have implemented stricter provisions concerning bonus clawing back for senior executives, including the 
former chief executives or board members. For instance, Lloyds and Royal Bank of Scotland, where government’s 
share equals 32.7 and 65% respectively, have been among the first that have implemented clawback clauses. This 
tendency can also be explained by the fact that during global financial crisis individual large banks have been bailed 
out by government, thereby it as a major shareholder tends to be ensured of effective financial performance and 
low reputational risks caused by senior employees’ mismanagement and frauds. 
In contrast to mentioned banks in Deutsche Bank the only large shareholder (BlackRock Inc., New York) 
holds 5.14% of bank’s shares. The similar ownership structure is in Credit Suisse: there are less than 10 
large shareholders owning more than 3%. The maximum stake equals 6.7% (Olayan Group) that is also not 
considered as influential. 
Secondly, the market conditions have certain influence on character of compensation policy and shareholders 
rights protection. There is certain directly-proportional interdependence between banking market concentra-
tion level and “strictness” of compensation policy. According to Deutsche Bank Markets Research devoted to 
European Banks Strategy (2012) Herfindahl-Hirschman index is relatively high in UK and Switzerland rep-
resented by Lloyds Banking Group, Royal Bank of Scotland, UBS in our sample. Thus, top 5 banks (among 
which UBS) had a 56.4% market share as at end of 2012. In UK the banking market consolidated due to 
financial crisis that has caused failures at range of banks. By the end of 2012 the five largest UK’s financial 
institutions had about 59 % of the market. In contrast, banking system of Germany remains the most frag-
mented among European – the Herfindahl-Hirschman index equaled 275 by the end of 2012 (opposed to 787.5 
in Switzerland or 601 in United Kingdom). The market share of top 5 banks in Germany has been equal to 
29.5%. As it seen, these tendencies are pretty correspond to the character of executive awards clawback policy 
in banks of our sample – the more concentrated market is, the stricter shareholders’ protection should be, as 
it a way out to minimize losses caused by reputational risks.  
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